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Abstract 
 
We use a unique World Bank survey of 1,088 private manufacturing firms from 18 Chinese 
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following main results: (1) the presence of CEO incentive schemes increases both corporate 
innovation effort and innovation performance; (2) sales-based performance measures in the 
incentive scheme, as compared with profit-based performance measure, are more conducive to 
firm innovation; and (3) CEO education level, professional background and political connection 
are positively associated with firm’s innovation efforts. The main results are robust to 
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implications.    
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Managerial Incentives, CEO Characteristics and Corporate 
Innovation in China’s Private Sector 
 
1. Introduction 
Since the opening up and reform in China in the late 1970s, the Chinese economy has 
been undergoing rapid changes and playing an increasingly important role in the world’s 
economy. As of today, in terms of size it is already the third largest economy in the world after 
the United States and Japan. The biggest spark for China’s economic growth has been the 
emergence of privately owned firms (e.g., Firth et al. 2009). According to Huang (2008), private 
entrepreneurship, facilitated by financial liberalization and microeconomic flexibility plays a 
central role in China’s economic miracle. According to the National Bureau of Statistics, the 
private sector accounted for roughly 50% of GNP in 2005 and this is expected to rise to at least 
75% by 2010
1
. 
However, there are concerns about the sustainability of China’s rapid growth and 
especially the growth of the private sector. Some Chinese economists favor changing the mode 
of economic growth from the current strategy, which is mainly based on cheap labor, high 
savings and investment, to a more efficient utilization of resources and greater technological 
progress (e.g., Wu, 2006). To this end, it is important to encourage innovation within Chinese 
firms. Unfortunately, the research and development (R&D) expenditures of Chinese firms have 
been very low. In the mid-1990s, the total R&D expenditure to GDP ratio was around 0.6%. 
Recently, that has been increasing at 1.34% in 2005. However, compared with developed 
economies such as the U.S. (2.57% in 2006) and Japan (3.18% in 2004), China is lagging behind 
in innovation
2
. As China becomes a dominant manufacturing power and exerts an increasing 
impact on the global economy, sustainable growth in China is crucial for world economic 
development. The focus of our study, therefore, is to shed some light on this issue and, in 
particular, to gain an understanding of those factors that drive or hinder corporate R&D in 
                                                 
1
 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-09/22/content_694432.htm 
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind08/c0/tt00-04.htm 
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China’s private sector, which is widely regarded as the major engine of China’s rapid growth 
(Allen, Qian and Qian, 2005)
3
. Furthermore, a recent article in The Economist (2009) magazine 
points out that smaller companies, which are mostly privately owned, are responsible for 66% of 
China’s patent applications and more than 80% of its new products. 
In this paper, we explore the determinants of innovation activities among a sample of 
firms in China’s private sector. In particular, we examine the roles of managerial incentive 
scheme and the chief executive officer (CEO) characteristics in affecting firm R&D activity. As 
is well-known, R&D spending is one of the most fundamental investment decisions made by top 
managers of firms (Barker and Mueller, 2002). Therefore, financial incentives and characteristics 
of a CEO matter greatly in determining a firm’s effort to conduct innovation activity. Given that 
R&D projects are typically risky and costly, providing managers with the right incentive so as to 
align their interests with the firm’s long-term goals should help encourage manageres to make 
greater effort in innovations. Furthermore, a CEO’s characteristics such as education, tenure, 
professional background, political connection, should also affect her R&D incentive. 
We use a unique 2003 World Bank survey of 1,088 private manufacturing firms in 18 
Chinese cities. The data are unique in that they provide detailed survey information about firm 
financial performance, managerial incentives, CEO characteristics, corporate R&D decisions, 
R&D intensity and new product sales. We find that firms that provide CEOs with significant 
shareholding and performance-based compensations are more likely to invest in R&D and tend 
to invest more in R&D. Regarding the primary performance measure in incentive contracts, sales 
as the primary performance measure exert more positive effect on the likelihood and intensity of 
R&D than do profit. Third, we find that CEOs with college education, professional background 
and political connection are more likely to invest in R&D and tend to invest more. In addition to 
these major findings, we also document that large firms with some market power also tend to 
                                                 
3
 Economists and business researchers have long believed that innovations are essential for the growth of the 
economy. Corporate’s research and development (R&D), by making contributions to innovations, help to enhance 
corporate productivity and attractiveness (Griliches 1998. Heeley et al. 2006). 
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have stronger incentive for R&D. Our results have important policy and managerial implications. 
They indicate that well-designed CEO incentive schemes are important in encouraging corporate 
R&D and enhancing a firm’s long term competitiveness and performance. In addition, CEO 
characteristics play an important role in corporate R&D decisions. 
Our paper is related to two sets of studies. First, there are a growing number of studies on 
R&D in Chinese manufacturing in recent years. For example, Hu (2001) examines the 
relationship between R&D expenditure and productivity in Chinese firms using survey data of 
high-tech firms in Haidian District of Beijing and finds a strong link between private R&D and 
firm productivity. Using a large panel data set of large-and medium-sized enterprises (LMEs), 
Jefferson et al. (2003) report that R&D activity is becoming more intensive both in inputs and 
outputs during the period of 1994-1999, although a broad-based take-off of R&D activity is yet 
to take place. Hu and Jefferson (2003) estimate the returns to R&D in Chinese industry using a 
firm-level data set on innovation activity of LMEs in Beijing area. They found that robust 
relationship between past R&D investments and profit and productivity in the cross-section 
dimension.
4
 More recently, Hu, Jefferson, and Qian (2005) find evidence of positive returns to 
firm in-house R&D in Chinese LMEs and that technology transfer (both domestic and foreign) 
benefits firm productivity largely through its interaction with in-house R&D activity. Zhang, 
Zhang, and Zhao (2003) investigate the R&D efficiency of Chinese firms and find that the state-
sector has significantly lower R&D and productive efficiency than the non-state sector. Our 
paper complements previous studies in examining two important determinants of R&D (namely 
managerial incentives and CEO characteristics) in Chinese private sector. In addition, our data 
set contains both LMEs and small firms. 
Second, our paper adds to the general literature on CEO incentives and corporate R&D. 
the unique survey data allow us to distinguish different CEO incentives and characteristics and 
examine their impact on corporate innovation activity. Despite its importance, little empirical 
                                                 
4
 In a theoretical model, Qian and Xu (1998) study the incentives of bureaucrats and the mechanisms used in a 
centralized economy in screening and selecting innovation projects. 
 5 
evidence is available about the relationship between CEO incentives and corporate innovation. 
Using the data of more than 300 publicly traded U.S. firms, Lerner and Wulf (2007) tests the 
relationship between performance pay given to central corporate research executives and 
corporate innovation in the U.S. context. Barker and Mueller (2002) examine the impacts of 
CEO characteristics on firm R&D spending using the data of 172 U.S. firms. To the best of our 
knowledge, no study has examined the impact of managerial incentives and CEO characteristics 
on corporate R&D in developing and transitional countries
5
. Our study therefore fills the gap in 
the literature.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops relevant hypotheses. 
Section 3 presents the data and defines the variables used in our statistical analysis. Section 4 
presents and discusses the empirical results, while Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Related Studies and Hypotheses 
 
2.1. CEO incentives 
 Two fundamental features of R&D activities are: They are uncertain and often require 
huge amount of investment. R&D investments may not yield the desired outcome (i.e., new 
products or new processes) or may not yield the desired outcome by a given date of time, due to 
both technical and economic reasons. Whether or not to engage in risky R&D projects is one of 
the most fundamental investment decisions made by the top managers of a firm (Baker and 
Mueller, 2002). Therefore, managerial incentives also play an important role in influencing 
corporate R&D. Generally, there are two reasons that managers are more risk averse than firm 
owners. First, while the firm owners can diversify their risk by owning shares in other businesses, 
managers’ wealth and employment security are directly and uniquely linked to the success or 
                                                 
5
 Using the data of China’s listed firms, Bai et al. (2004) explores the impacts of corporate governance on firm value. 
Using a panel data set of CEO contracts from more than 300 Chinese state-owned enterprises, Bai et al. (2005) 
studies the CEO incentives in China’s SOEs.  
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failure of a firm’s specific projects and cannot be diversified. Therefore, their incentives to take 
risk are curtailed (e.g., Beatty, R. P. and Zajac, E.J., 1994; Gray and Cannella, 1997; Wiseman 
and Gomez-Mejia, 1998; Balkin, Markman, and Gomez-Mejia, 2000). Second, managers tend to 
have more short-term focuses than owners since they generally do not have equity ownership 
with the firm and are rewarded by short-term incentives such as base pay and bonus (e.g., Tosi et 
al., 2000). 
 It is argued that, theoretically, managerial incentive payoffs can mitigate the effects of 
agency problems and CEO risk aversion so that CEOs are more willing to take on risky projects 
(Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006). As R&D and innovations are possibly one of the most risky 
long-term investments and are more prone to asymmetric information, it is essential to reward 
managers to induce them to work for the benefit of the firm’s owners. However, the empirical 
studies on this issue are very limited and mostly in the US context. For example, Balkin, 
Markman, and Gomez-Mejia (2000) examine the relationship between innovation and CEO pay 
in 90 high-technology firms. With firm size, performance, and other factors controlled, they find 
that CEO short-term compensation was related to innovation as measured by number of patents 
and R&D spending. Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) provide evidence of a strong causal 
relationship between managerial compensation, and investment policy as well as firm risk. In 
particular, they find that a higher sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility (vega) leads to the 
implementation of riskier choices, including relatively more investment in R&D. Another recent 
study by Lerner and Wulf (2007) finds that in U.S. centralized R&D organizations, more long-
term incentives (e.g., stock options and restricted stock) to R&D department head are associated 
with more heavily cited patents.  
It is recognized that China’s enterprises are plagued by agency problems due to weak 
manager incentive schemes and restricted decision-making power (Chang and Wong, 2004). 
Hence, it would be interesting to explore the impact of these factors on corporate innovation 
activities in China. We therefore pose the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 1. CEOs with more financial incentives linking their compensations with firm 
performance make more efforts in R&D. 
 
2.2. CEO characteristics 
 A CEO’s background and other characteristics should also be important in her receptivity 
to innovative ideas and activities. Barker and Muller (2002) argue that CEOs’ career experience 
in various functions is important in corporate R&D decisions, as their perceptions of new 
technology will be biased by their prior functional experience. For example, a CEO with 
significant career experience in output functions (i.e., R&D/engineering and marketing/sales) 
will favor innovative strategies because these business functions emphasize growth through 
discovering new products and markets. In contrast, a CEO with career experience in throughput 
functions (i.e., accounting/finance, production, administration and legal) will work at improving 
the efficiency of the organization (e.g., Finkesltein and Hambrick, 1996). In the Chinese context, 
we believe that whether the CEO comes from a professional background will affect her view of 
innovation. A CEO with a professional background will be more skillful in business decision 
making and arguably more inclined to take risks. Therefore, we pose the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2A. CEO’s professional background is positively associated with a firm’s innovation 
activities. 
   It has been found in the recent finance and economics literature that political 
connections help firms to secure favorable regulatory conditions (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001), 
better access to finance such as bank loans (Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Claessens, Feijend, Laeven, 
2008), and potential bailouts (Faccio, McConnell, and Masulis, 2006), which ultimately 
increases the value of firms (Fisman, 2001; Calomiris, Fisman and Wang, 2009) or improves 
their performance (Li, Meng, Wang and Zhou, 2008). In this regards, the CEO political 
connection might help the firm to get access to financial and other resources and helping hands 
from the government in conducting R&D activities. On the other hand, a former government 
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official/bureaucrat may be less innovative, as her career experience is more closely related to 
bureaucracy and her skills are less business oriented. Therefore, we pose the following 
competing hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 2B. CEO’s political connection is positively associated with a firm’s innovation 
activities. 
Hypothesis 2C. CEO’s political connection is negatively associated with a firm’s innovation 
activities. 
 Another CEO background variable is CEO education. Obviously, as R&D and innovation 
activities are typically associated with new technology or new products, better educated 
executives tend to have greater cognitive complexity to absorb new ideas, which therefore 
increases the probability of accepting innovations (Barker and Mueller, 2002). This argument 
leads to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2D. CEO’s education level is positively associated with a firm’s innovation activities. 
 
 CEO tenure might also exert impact on corporate R&D. Miller (1991) argues that longer-
tenured CEOs may lose touch with their organizational environment and hence may not make the 
changes and risky investments to keep the firm evolving over time. On the other hand, 
Hirshleifer (1993) argues that shorter-tenured CEOs might have strong incentives to focus on 
short-term outcomes in order to build their reputation and therefore might be less willing to 
invest in highly risky R&D projects. We therefore view the relationship between CEO tenure and 
corporate R&D as an empirical question and will examine the relationship in our empirical 
analysis. 
 
2.3. Other control variables 
 We also control other cofactors that might affect a firm’s innovative activity. The first are 
firm-based control variables. The so-called Schumpeterian hypothesis claims that innovation is 
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fostered by a climate where firms are large or in industries where there is less competition. 
Therefore, in our following empirical analysis, we control for company size as well as industry 
competitiveness. We also control the firm age variable, as it is believed that as firms get older, 
they may tend to look more inward and have less incentive to innovate (e.g., Tassey 1991). 
Second, we control variables for business environment such as local market size, GDP growth, 
and the number of higher education institutions, as these may also be important determinants of 
business decisions in firm’s innovations in a given city. Finally, we also control for industry 
effect in our regression analysis to take into account the fact that some industries are relatively 
more technology-oriented while others are more traditional.  
 
3. Sample and Variables 
3.1 Sample 
 Our primary database is the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey 
(BEEPS), conducted jointly by the World Bank and the Enterprise Survey Organization of China 
in the early 2003. The main purpose of the survey is to identify the driving factors behind and 
obstacles to enterprise performance and growth in China. The survey asks firm managers to 
answer questions about market structure, institutional environment, corporate governance, 
ownership structure of the firm, and standard information on financial statements. In particular, 
the survey asks questions on corporate R&D expenditures and innovations such as patents, new 
products and new production process. Specifically, the firm R&D expenditures are reported for 
each year from 2000 to 2002. The innovation output measure is based on firm’s sales revenues of 
new products reported in the survey for each year from 2000 to 2002. While many of the 
quantitative variables (e.g. R&D expenditure, new product sales, firm size and firm age) contain 
observations from 2000 to 2002, some of the qualitative questions (e.g. managerial incentives, 
CEO characteristics) only pertain to the year 2002. Hence, in the full-sample regression analysis 
of this paper, some qualitative variables are time invariant, while some quantitative variables 
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vary over the time period. In addition to the firm-level data set, we collect the macro control 
variables from the City Statistical Yearbook of China.  
Our original sample has 1,572 non-listed manufacturing firms and 4,716 firm-year 
observations. Of these, 168 firm-year observations are dropped due to missing values of R&D 
expenditures
6
. We further drop another 267 observations due to missing values of other variables 
such as market competition and drop another 206 firm-year observations for which the CEO has 
more than 50% of the share outstanding
7
. Lastly, we focus our analysis on the firms with no state 
ownership
8
.  The final three-year pooled sample consists of 3,192 observations, with a sample of 
1,088 firms for the year of 2002.  
Table 1 provides brief descriptions of the sample distributions and innovative activities 
across the cities and sectors. The cities are sorted in a descending order based on the percentage 
of firms engaged in R&D. The second column lists the number of samples from each city/sector. 
The third column lists the percentage of firms with R&D investment in each city/sector. The 
fourth column lists each city/sector’s average R&D intensity, measured as the ratio of R&D 
expenditure to total sales revenue. The fifth column presents each city/sector’s average new 
product sales, measured as the percentage of sales from new product in total sales. Overall, 38% 
of firms in our sample have invested in R&D, with a mean R&D intensity of 1.3% and average 
new product sales 12.9%. 
[Table 1 here] 
From Table 1, we observe at least two patterns: (1) Innovative activities vary 
significantly across cities and sectors. For instance, over 68% of the enterprises in Hangzhou city 
report making positive R&D investment; while only about 13.5% of the enterprises in Kunming 
invested in R&D. About 54.9% of the enterprises in electronic equipment sector report making 
                                                 
6
 We replace those missing R&D expenditures with zero in our regression analysis in a robust check. The results are 
highly consistent with our main findings. 
7
 For a private firm whose CEO is the owner, an incentive plan in compensation may not be necessary since the 
CEO is the residual claimer. Since the main task of this study is to examine the impact of CEO incentive schemes on 
corporate R&D, we focus on the subsample where CEOs have  relatively small portion of shares. The empirical 
results, however, are highly robust if the full sample is used in the analysis. 
8
 In our sample, about 80% of the firms are private firms with no state ownership. 
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positive R&D investment; while only about 10.9% of the enterprises in transportation equipment 
sector invested in R&D. (2) Higher percentage of R&D participation generally induces more new 
product sales. 
 
3.2 Variables and Measures 
 Table 2 lists the definition of all the variables used in this analysis. We discuss those 
variables in more detail in the following sections. 
[Table 2 here] 
3.2.1. Dependent variables  
The innovation measure is the dependent variable in our analysis. Nevertheless, it is 
difficult to find a perfect measure due to the nature of broad scope of innovative activities. As 
early as in 1930, Joseph Schumpter defined five types of firm innovations (see OECD, 1997, 
page 28). Those include the introduction of new product or service, new process of production, 
opening of new markets, new sources of raw materials and change of industrial organization. In 
order to set a benchmark for innovation survey and research, the OECD definition (OECD, 1997) 
of innovation focuses on the first two Schumpter measures: the introduction of both new product 
and new production process. Here the emphasis is on the commercialization of innovative 
activities. That is, those new products or processes need to be commercialized to generate profit. 
This definition also excludes organizational innovation partly due to “its measurement appears to 
be very difficult both conceptually and in practice”. 
We believe the best way to assess innovation is to make distinction between innovation 
input and innovation output. In terms of input, R&D investment decision dummy and R&D 
intensity have been the most widely used R&D measures (e.g. Cohen, and Klepper, 1996; Balkin, 
et al., 2000; Lee and O’Neill, 2003; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006). These measures are easy 
to understand and easy to obtain from firm’s financial statements. The potential shortcoming of 
these measures is that they do not capture the outcome of innovation. That is, there is an implicit 
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assumption which states that the R&D efficiency is similar across firms. Firms spending more on 
R&D are assumed to be also more innovative (Acs and Audretsch, 1987).  
To avoid the shortcoming of R&D input measure, some authors have been relying on the 
innovation output measures. Those output measures include the number of patents granted 
(Griliches, 1990; Balkin, et al, 2000; Argyres and Silverman, 2004; Lerner and Wulf, 2007) and 
patent forward citations (Lerner and Wulf, 2007; Hall, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2001). A possible 
drawback of patent data is that patent does not necessarily represent a commercially exploited 
innovation. Consistent with the OECD definition of innovation, Bhattacharya and Harry (2004) 
use a dummy variable of new product development as a measure of innovation. In another study, 
Kochhar and David (1996) use the number of new products as a measure of firm innovation. 
However, these measures cannot measure the commercial value of the new products.  
Given the merits and limitations of each innovation measure, we evaluate firm innovative 
activities by comprehensive measures of both innovative input and output. For innovation 
input/effort measures, we use R&D intensity and an R&D decision dummy. The first measure is 
a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm made positive investment in R&D in a specific year 
(R&D Decision), while the second measure is the amount of R&D spending as a percentage of 
total sales (R&D Intensity). For innovation output measures, we use the new product sales to 
capture the innovative outputs. Specifically, the dataset contains a question about the sales 
revenue of the new product (New Product Sales) as percentage of the total sales. This variable is 
also a very standard measure of firm innovations because it both takes the commercial value of 
the new products into account and also overcomes the shortcoming of using a discrete R&D 
output measure
9
. Following the seminal work by Crepon, Duguet and Mairesse (1998), many 
studies have used this variable to measure corporate innovation performance (e.g.  Czarnitzki 
and Kraft, 2004; Czarnitzki, 2005; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006). 
 
                                                 
9
 This variable becomes a standard measure in the European Community Innovation Surveys since 1993. 
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3.2.2. Independent variables 
CEO incentives are captured by a set of variables. The first one is a continuous measure 
of CEO’s ownership (CEO Ownership) of the firm, which equals to natural logarithm of one plus 
the percentage of stock held by the CEO. The second one is a dummy variable (CEO Incentive) 
which equals to one if there is an incentive plan linking the CEO’s compensations with the firm’s 
performance and zero otherwise. Drilling further down to explore how the managerial incentives 
influence the corporate R&D activities, we look in details at the primary performance measures 
in the incentive contracts. Two dummy variables are constructed based on the survey
10
. Profit 
incentive contract is a dummy variable which takes on the value of one if the primary CEO 
performance measure in the incentive contract is firm’s profitability. Sales incentive contract is a 
dummy variable which takes on the value of one if the primary CEO performance measure in the 
incentive contract is the firm’s sales revenue. The benchmark group is the group of firms that use 
other primary performance measures (e.g. safety) in their CEO incentive contracts. Furthermore, 
we use another variable (Delta) to measure the CEO pay performance sensitivity. This variable is 
constructed base on a unique question in the survey which asks about the percentage of CEO 
income increase for each one percent increase of the firm’s primary performance measure. The 
variable, which directly measures CEO incentives, has been used widely in executive 
compensation literature (e.g. Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2006). 
Regarding the professional background, CEOs with business management experience are 
classified as professionals. One entry of the survey asks about the position of the CEO before he 
or she is nominated as CEO for the current firm. If the CEO was a manager before his or her 
current position, we code variable professional as one, and zero otherwise.  Following the recent 
literature (e.g. Firth, Lin, Liu, Wong, 2009), we classify politically connected CEOs based on 
their previous employment in the government agencies. Official is a dummy variable that is 
equal to one if the general manager (this is the CEO in U.S. parlance) was a government official 
                                                 
10
 Since the sample contains non-listed private manufacturing firms, stock market performance is not used as a 
primary performance measure in most incentive contracts. 
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before taking a position in the enterprise, and zero otherwise. Furthermore, college represents the 
CEO’s education level. It equals to one if the CEO has college or above education, and zero 
otherwise. Tenure measures the years of CEO tenure. 
 
3.2.3. Other Control variables 
We control for several factors known to affect firm R&D investment. Firm performance 
is measured by return on asset (ROA), the ratio of operating income before tax to total asset. 
Firm size is measured by the nature logarithm of the end-of-year total number of employees. 
Firm Age is the number of years since the enterprise was established. We also include city GDP 
growth rate, city population, and the number of universities in the city (university) as the macro-
control variables. Furthermore, we control for the market structure by including a series of 
competition dummy variables (Comp_1:1-3 competitors in the firm’s main market; Comp_2: 4-6 
competitors in the firm’s main market; Comp_3: 7-15 competitors in the firm’s main market; 
Comp_4: 16-100 competitors in the firm’s main market). Lastly, since innovations may cluster in 
certain region or in certain industry, we include the city average R&D investment and industry 
average R&D investment to account for the innovation variations across regions and sectors.  
 
4. Empirical Analysis and Results 
4.1 Summary Statistics 
 Table 3 reports summary statistics and makes some basic comparisons of firm innovation. 
Panel A presents the basic summary statistics of the key variables discussed in the previous 
section. 
[Table 3 here] 
Panel B of table 3 compares the differences in R&D activities across various incentive 
schemes. In column 1 and column 2, we split the sample according to whether there exists any 
CEO incentive plan. In column 3 and 4, we divide the sample according to the CEO’s ownership 
in the firm. In the last two columns, we compares innovations according to the CEOs’ education 
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background, that is, whether the CEO has a university or above degree. Consistent with 
hypothesis 2A, firms with CEO incentive scheme (or CEO ownership) are more likely to invest 
and generally invest more in R&D. Although not reported, we find that firms with neither 
incentive scheme nor CEO ownership are associated with even lower R&D investment and 
innovations. We find that firms with college educated CEOs are more likely to invest and tend to 
invest more in R&D. 
In general, table 3 documents some preliminary relationships between CEO incentives, 
CEO characteristics, and corporate R&D, which are mostly consistent with the hypotheses in 
Section 2. In the following analysis, we perform more rigorous study of those relations with 
multivariate Probit and Tobit models. 
The correlations among the key variables are presented in Table 4. As can be seen from 
the table, multicollinearity is not a serious problem for the variables. Most of the correlation 
coefficients between independent variables are below 0.3, which makes us comfortable to 
include these variables in the models simultaneously.  
[Table 4 here] 
 
4.2 R&D investment 
4.2.1. Probit model on R&D Investment Decision 
To examine the relationship between CEO incentives, characteristics, and firm 
innovations, we use Probit and Tobit regressions separately. Both approaches are widely used in 
the literature on R&D investment.  
` We first use the Probit model to explore the potential determinants of a firm’s R&D 
investment decisions. The probability function of investment in R&D is expressed as following:  
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where )(f  is the standard normal cumulative distribution (cdf) in the Probit model, which can be 
expressed as 


z
dvvzzf )()()(  , where )( is the standard normal density. Firm 
characteristics are captured by a vector of control variables, which include the firm performance 
(ROA), firm size, firm age. Macro controls include city population, GDP growth, and the 
number of colleges and research institutions within the city. Competition dummies and city and 
industry R&D investment decision are also controlled for. Furthermore, the heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors clustered at the firm level are used in computing t-values. The results of 
the Probit models are presented in Table 5
11
.  
[Table 5 here] 
As can be seen in table 5, the coefficients of all CEO share and Incentive Compensation are 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% or 5% levels in all model specifications, suggesting 
that stronger managerial incentives results in a higher probability of investing in R&D. In a more 
detailed look at more specific incentive measures, we find that sales performance based incentive 
scheme exerts a larger positive effect on the likelihood of R&D investment than does the profit-
based incentive scheme.  The different effects might come from the difference in focuses of 
various incentive plans. Profit-based incentive contract focus more on firm profitability, which 
might be negatively affected by corporate R&D investment in the short term before innovation 
activity is completed and generates new sales and profits. This feature may discourage CEOs to 
engage in R&D activity.  On the other hand, sales performance based incentive contract 
emphasize more on market shares, which may not be directly linked to on-going R&D 
investments of the firm. Therefore, CEOs with sales-based incentives might be more willing to 
invest in R&D projects than are the CEOs with profit-based incentives. Furthermore, we also 
find that the CEO pay-performance sensitivity (Delta) is positively associated with the likelihood 
                                                 
11
 As mentioned previously, in the full-sample regression analysis of this paper, some qualitative variables are time 
invariant (e.g. managerial incentives, CEO background), while some quantitative variables vary over the time period. 
The presented results are based on the full sample (2000 to 2002). The cross sectional sample in year 2002 yield 
very similar results. For brevity, the cross sectional results are not presented but available from the authors.  
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of corporate R&D investment. The effect is statistically significant at the 1% level. Overall, the 
empirical results strongly support the hypothesis 2A that CEOs with more financial incentives 
linking their compensation with firm performance are more likely to make R&D investment. 
Regarding the CEO characteristics, the coefficients of College are positive and statistically 
significant in all model specification, suggesting that firms with college educated CEOs are more 
likely to invest in R&D projects. The empirical results bolster our hypothesis 2D that CEO 
education level is positively associated with the likelihood of R&D investment. The coefficients 
of Professional background and Official are positively and statistically at the 1% level, 
suggesting that CEOs with professional background and political connection are more likely to 
make R&D investments. The empirical results strongly support our hypotheses 2A and 2B, 
respectively. In addition, we find marginally significant and positive relationship between CEO 
tenure and the likelihood of R&D investment. 
The control variables also yield some interesting results. As expected, the industry and city 
R&D investment tendency is strongly and positively associated with the likelihood of corporate 
R&D investment. We find that both firm performance and firm size are positively and 
significantly (at the 1% level) associated with the likelihood of a firm’s R&D investment. Firm 
age has a somewhat negative impact on corporate R&D decision, suggesting that older firms 
tend to be less innovative. City population is positively related to a firm’s R&D incentive, 
indicating the positive effect of a local market. Other macro controls do not enter the models 
significantly.  
 
4.2.2. Tobit model on R&D Intensity 
The analysis so far focuses on the probability of undertaking R&D investment. We next 
explore the relationship between various covariates and the amount of R&D spending as well as 
a measure of innovation output, namely sales of new product. Since the dependent variable is left 
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censored at 0, the Tobit model is employed in the analysis.
12
 The estimation is based on the three 
year sample with firm clustering effect. In addition, as a violation of the homoscedasticity 
assumption would lead to inconsistent coefficient estimates in Tobit models, we estimate the 
Tobit models with variance adjusted for heteroskedasticity by firm size. The empirical results are 
presented in Table 6. 
[Table 6 here] 
The Tobit estimation results confirm our previous findings in the Probit model. The 
coefficients of CEO ownership and incentive are positive and statistically significant for the first 
two models, suggesting that firms with stronger managerial incentives tend to invest more in 
R&D. Regarding the more specific incentive measures, we find that sales performance based 
incentive scheme exerts a more positive effect on R&D intensity than does the profit-based 
incentive scheme.  In addition, the CEO pay-performance sensitivity (Delta) is positively 
associated with the corporate R&D intensity. 
Similarly, the relation between CEO background and R&D investment is also consistent 
with previous findings. Firm managers with a professional background or higher education 
degrees tend to spend more in R&D projects, as indicated by the positive and statistically 
significant coefficients of college and professional in the Tobit regressions for R&D intensity.  
Consistent with the Probit model, we also find that CEOs with political connection have exerted 
positive and significant impacts on R&D intensity. As expected, the industry and city average 
R&D investment spending are positively associated with the corporate R&D intensity. 
Overall, the Tobit results bolster our previous findings and confirm the hypotheses 1, 2A, 
2B and 2D. 
4.2.3. Instrumental Variable Analysis 
 In our study, the potential endogeneity problem may not be a serious problem because it 
seems not very likely that an individual firm’s R&D decision and investment will influence the 
                                                 
12
 The estimation method is not presented because the model is well known and widely used in the literature. 
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managerial incentives and ownership. Nevertheless, it is still possible that R&D decision and the 
managerial incentive schemes are jointly determined by some unobserved characteristics of the 
firm. To deal with this potential endogeneity problem, we need to use the instrumental variable 
analysis. However, it is not easy to find the instrumental variables since we already control for 
many firm characteristics such as performance, size and age, competition, etc. We follow the 
approach in selection of instrumental variables in the recent literature of economic development 
(Reinikka and Svensson, 2006; Fisman and Svensson, 2007). Specifically, Fisman and Svensson 
(2007) use industry-location averages as instruments. They point out that if the endogeneity 
problem is specific for firms, but not for industries or locations, then netting out this firm-
specific component yields a measure that only depends on the underlying characteristics of 
inherent to particular industries and/or locations (Reinikka and Svensson, 2006; Fisman and 
Svensson, 2007). In our case, firms in the same location and industry may compete for the talent 
manager in the local labor market. The provision of managerial incentive schemes by a firm may 
depend on whether or not local competitors offer similar incentive schemes. Moreover, incentive 
scheme decisions by local competitors should not have a direct impact on this firm’s R&D 
investment. Therefore, we follow Fisman and Svensson (2007) to instrument for CEO incentive 
measures (i.e. CEO share, Incentive Compensation, Profit incentive contract, Sales incentive 
contract, delta) using their location-industry averages as instruments
13
. ROA is also subject to 
endogenity problem. We also instrument the firm ROA using the industry-region mean ROA as 
instrumental variables. With these instrumental variables, the standard IV Probit and Tobit 
(Newey, 1987) are used and the empirical results are presented in table 7.  
[Table 7 here] 
As can be seen in Table 7, our empirical results are very robust to the instrumental 
variable analysis. Firms with managerial incentive schemes are more likely to conduct R&D and 
                                                 
13
 We are not claiming that these variables are the best instrumental variables. Instead, we hold that the instruments 
are reasonably exogenous and have decent explanatory power of firm’s managerial incentive schemes. Similar to the 
claim in Lerner and Wulf (2007), our study at least shows some very strong relationship between managerial 
incentives and corporate innovations.  
 
 20 
tend to invest more in R&D, as indicated by the positive and statistically significant coefficients 
of CEO Ownership and Incentives in all model specifications. Consistent with previous findings, 
we find that sales performance based incentive scheme exerts a more positive effect on R&D 
likelihood and intensity than does the profit-based incentive scheme. The coefficient for ROA 
remains positive and significant
14
. 
Regarding the control variables, firm size is positively associated with both the likelihood 
and the amount of R&D investment. Firm age is negatively associated with both the likelihood 
and the amount of R&D investment. Market competition dummies are included in the model 
specifications. For brevity, the coefficients are not reported. 
Using the IV Tobit models, we also check the robustness to various firm size controls. 
The sample includes firms across all size categories. Therefore, a very natural conjecture is that 
firm size might exert a non-linear effect on corporate R&D. We therefore include a square term 
into the model specification to test the robustness of the results. Alternatively, we categorize the 
sample into large (more than 329 employees in the firm), medium size (more than 109 but less 
than 329 employees in the firm) and small firms (less than 109 employees in the firm) based on 
the sample distribution. We construct three size dummies accordingly and test the robustness of 
the results to the inclusion of these size dummies. The empirical results are presented in Table 8. 
As can be seen from the table, all the main effects remain significant and the empirical results are 
highly consistent with our previous findings. 
 [Table 8 here] 
 
4.3. Innovation Performance 
                                                 
14
 We notice that the t-statistics are generally higher in the IV estimation.  This might indicate the existence of 
potential measurement error, which would tend to “attenuate” the coefficient estimate toward insignificant (Rajan 
and Subramania, 2005). This pattern has been documented in some recent papers (e.g. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine, 2006). In addition, we use the standard Newey IV Probit and Tobit, which does not allow for clustering and 
variance adjustment for heteroskedasticity by firm size. The MLE estimation is not used because the convergence 
cannot be reached. Therefore, the t-statistics might not be readily comparable across models. It is also worth noting 
that our main results do not depend on instrumentation, although the latter increases the statistical significance. 
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The aforementioned analyses focus on the input side of the innovation (i.e. R&D 
investment decision and R&D intensity). We now consider the effects of managerial incentives 
and CEO characteristics on R&D output, measured by the new product sales. As discussed 
earlier, new product sales are a standard measure of innovation performance in the literature. We 
repeat our previous analysis using New Product Sales as the dependent variable. The estimation 
is based on IV tobit models discussed in the previous section. The empirical results are presented 
in table 9. 
[Table 9 here] 
As can be seen from the table, stronger managerial incentives improve innovation 
performance, as indicated by the positive and statistically significant coefficients of incentive 
measures. As discussed earlier, this might be due to fact that stronger managerial incentives 
mitigate agency problem to make decisions that increase private benefits of the management at 
the expense of shareholders, such as funding of “pet projects”, and consequently improve 
innovation performance. We do not find statistically significant impacts of CEO characteristics 
on innovation performance. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Using a unique World Bank survey of 1,088 private manufacturing firms from 18 
Chinese cities over the period 2000 to 2002, we find the following main results: (1) the presence 
of CEO incentive schemes increases both corporate innovation effort and innovation 
performance; (2) sales based performance measure in the incentive scheme, as compared with 
profit based performance measure, is more conducive to firm innovation; and (3) CEO education 
level, professional background and political connection are positively associated with firm’s 
innovation efforts. Beyond these main findings, we also find that younger and larger firms in less 
competitive industries tend to conduct more R&D. A larger local market (as proxied by 
population) also seems to be associated with greater corporate innovation activities. Finally, 
some evidence suggests that local technological and innovation infrastructure (as proxied by the 
 22 
number of local education institutions) is positively related to corporate innovation activities. 
Our findings have important policy implications because innovations have long been understood 
to be a key driver of economic growth and because China’s private sector is widely regarded as 
the major engine of China’s rapid growth.  
 Finally, we would like to point out that we do not intend to provide a comprehensive 
study of determinants of corporate R&D in China in this paper. Rather, our focus is on internal 
mechanisms/factors that can affect corporate R&D effort. To the best of our knowledge, our 
paper is among the first to study the effects of CEO incentive schemes and characteristics on 
firm R&D activity. External factors such as country’s property right protection system, 
government tax and subsidy policies, etc., are obviously also important factors influencing firm 
incentive for R&D. These important issues, however, are left for future research. 
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Table 1A: R&D comparison across sample cities  
 
 Sample R&D Decision R&D intensity New Product Sales 
Hangzhou  142 0.683 0.013 0.210 
Chongqing  215 0.660 0.022 0.214 
Wuhan  217 0.525 0.015 0.135 
Changchun  228 0.513 0.017 0.160 
Jiangmen  163 0.491 0.012 0.070 
Xian  202 0.490 0.016 0.146 
Shenzhen  159 0.421 0.014 0.162 
Wenzhou  138 0.399 0.005 0.170 
Guiyang  153 0.392 0.022 0.101 
Nanchang  161 0.354 0.011 0.125 
Dalian  140 0.336 0.009 0.106 
Changsha  189 0.302 0.010 0.178 
Haerbin  207 0.261 0.018 0.120 
Zhengzhou  245 0.249 0.009 0.125 
Nanning  160 0.244 0.017 0.060 
Benxi  153 0.176 0.014 0.108 
Lanzhou  150 0.167 0.004 0.053 
Kunming  170 0.135 0.002 0.034 
Total  3192 0.383 0.013 0.129 
 
 
Table 1B: R&D comparison across sample sectors 
 
sector Sample R&D Decision R&D intensity New Product Sales 
Electronic equipment 563 0.549 0.025 0.184 
Auto & auto parts 719 0.473 0.009 0.160 
Chemical products & 
medicine 
170 0.429 0.029 0.094 
Electronic parts making 557 0.397 0.014 0.121 
Food processing 129 0.333 0.015 0.098 
Metallurgical products  275 0.233 0.015 0.091 
Garment & leather products 724 0.228 0.003 0.096 
Transportation equipment 55 0.109 0.005 0.033 
Total 3192 0.383 0.013 0.129 
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Table 2: Variable Definition  
 
Variable  Definition  
R&D decision Dummy variable, equals to one if the firm has reported a positive expense on 
R&D in a corresponding year. 
R&D Intensity R&D intensity, defined as R&D expenditure divided by total sales. 
New Product Sales Sales of new product, measured as a percentage of total sales. 
CEO share Ln(1+CEO share ratio) 
Incentive Dummy variable, equals to one if the CEO’s income is linked with firm 
performance. 
Sales Incentive Contract Sales as primary performance measure in the incentive contract. 
Profit Incentive Contract Profit as primary performance measure in the incentive contract. 
Delta Sensitivity of CEO income to firm performance. Measured as the percentage 
of CEO income increase for each one percent increase of the firm’s primary 
performance measure. 
College Dummy variable, equals to one if the CEO has a college or above education 
background. 
Official  Dummy variable, equals to one if the CEO was a government official before 
the current position. 
Professional  Dummy variable, equals to one if the CEO was a manager before her current 
position. 
CEO Tenure  Tenure of CEO 
Firm Size Measured as the nature logarithm of total number of employment. 
Large Firm Dummy variable for firm size, equals to one if there are more than 329 
employees in the firm, zero otherwise  
Median Firm Dummy variable for firm size, equals to one if there are more than 109 but 
less than 329 employees in the firm, zero otherwise  
Firm age Years since the firm was established. 
Comp_1 Dummy Variable, Equals to 1 if there is 1-3 competitors in the firm’s main 
market, 0 otherwise 
Comp_2 Dummy Variable, Equals to 1 if there is 4-6 competitors in the firm’s main 
market, 0 otherwise 
Comp_3 Dummy Variable, Equals to 1 if there is 7-15 competitors in the firm’s main 
market, 0 otherwise 
Comp_4 Dummy Variable, Equals to 1 if there is 16-100 competitors in the firm’s 
main market, 0 otherwise 
Population  city population. 
GDP growth city GDP growth rate. 
University the number of universities in the city. 
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Table 3: Summary statistics of key variables and comparison across groups  
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics (Sample size: 3192) 
 
 mean sd min max 
R&D decision 0.383 0.486 0.000 1.000 
R&D Intensity 0.013 0.053 0.000 0.919 
New Product Sales  0.129 0.236 0.000 1.000 
CEO share 0.047 0.105 0.000 0.405 
Incentive 0.254 0.435 0.000 1.000 
Profit  incentive contract 0.037 0.189 0.000 1.000 
Sales incentive contract 0.198 0.399 0.000 1.000 
Delta  0.008 0.038 0.000 0.500 
College 0.786 0.410 0.000 1.000 
Official  0.028 0.165 0.000 1.000 
Professional 0.496 0.500 0.000 1.000 
CEO Tenure  1.767 0.516 0.693 3.932 
ROA 0.020 0.082 -0.161 0.223 
Firm Size 4.982 1.330 2.303 9.649 
Large  0.258 0.438 0.000 1.000 
Median 0.300 0.458 0.000 1.000 
Firm age 12.320 12.460 0.000 52.000 
Population  6.299 0.692 4.828 8.044 
GDP growth 9.564 0.627 8.545 11.994 
University 19.780 11.541 1.000 48.000 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: R&D between different incentive schemes  
 No 
Incentive  
Incentive CEO w/o Share CEO w/ Share Below 
college 
college 
Sample Size 2381  811  2411  781  683  2509  
R&D decision 0.011 0.020*** 0.010 0.023*** 0.004 0.016*** 
R&D Intensity 0.324 0.554*** 0.356 0.464*** 0.171 0.440*** 
New Product Sales 0.113 0.175*** 0.119 0.159*** 0.095 0.138*** 
Note: Asterisks in the third column indicate that innovation activities are significantly higher for CEOs 
whose income is linked with firm performance. In the fifth column they indicate whether innovation 
activities are significantly higher for firms whose CEOs hold shares of that firm. In the last column they 
indicate that innovation activities are significantly higher for CEOs with college or higher education. One-
tail T-test significant levels are reported. Three asterisks indicate a significance level of 1%. 
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Table 4: Correlation Matrix 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1:R&D/Sales             
2:CEO share 0.092*            
3:Incentive  0.079* 0.033            
4: Profit  incentive contract 0.056* 0.035* 0.851*          
5:Sales incentive contract 0.047* -0.004  0.337* -0.098*          
6:Delta  0.012 0.013 0.379 0.346 0.119         
7: College 0.095* -0.057* 0.161 0.129* 0.066* 0.048        
8:Official 0.052* 0.0003  0.050 0.050 -0.033  -0.016  0.061       
9:Professional  0.053* -0.066* 0.107* 0.059 0.099* 0.037* 0.163* -0.168*      
10:CEO Tenure  -0.038* 0.022  -0.145* -0.096 -0.099 -0.038 -0.233* -0.025 -0.124*     
11:ROA -0.015 0.029 0.104 0.110 0.004 0.073* 0.068 0.0301 -0.052* -0.029    
12:Firm Size -0.011  -0.082 0.143 0.135* 0.053* 0.042* 0.290* -0.022  0.228* -0.129 0.058   
13:Firm Age -0.053* -0.093 -0.084 -0.081* 0.006  -0.027  -0.061* -0.006  0.120* 0.081 -0.158* 0.213 
* indicates a significance level of at least 5% 
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Table 5 Probit regressions on the determinants of R&D investment decision 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CEO Share 0.5957 0.6745 0.5996 0.6786 
 (2.475)** (2.779)*** (2.487)** (2.787)*** 
Incentive Compensation 0.4199 0.3899   
 (7.415)*** (6.849)***   
Profit  incentive contract   0.3085 0.2799 
   (4.631)*** (4.198)*** 
Sales incentive contract   0.6257 0.6011 
   (4.773)*** (4.568)*** 
Delta   2.6124 2.6358 
   (3.348)*** (3.482)*** 
College  0.2440  0.2442 
  (3.344)***  (3.330)*** 
Official  0.3694  0.4120 
  (2.327)**  (2.613)*** 
Professional   0.1193  0.1149 
  (2.273)**  (2.183)** 
CEO tenure  0.0688  0.0771 
  (1.355)  (1.515) 
ROA 1.3794 1.3989 1.3303 1.3437 
 (4.509)*** (4.532)*** (4.356)*** (4.355)*** 
Firm Size 0.3108 0.2909 0.3116 0.2925 
 (14.745)*** (13.291)*** (14.777)*** (13.383)*** 
Firm Age -0.0079 -0.0078 -0.0081 -0.0081 
 (3.633)*** (3.584)*** (3.731)*** (3.686)*** 
Population 0.2559 0.2495 0.2718 0.2662 
 (4.144)*** (4.036)*** (4.382)*** (4.287)*** 
GDP growth 0.0494 0.0323 0.0674 0.0521 
 (0.855) (0.555) (1.165) (0.892) 
University 0.0056 0.0047 0.0057 0.0049 
 (2.027)** (1.697)* (2.064)** (1.761)* 
Competition Dummies yes yes yes yes 
Industry Dummies yes yes yes yes 
Constant -4.8196 -4.8449 -5.0970 -5.1657 
 (5.762)*** (5.774)*** (6.069)*** (6.128)*** 
Observations 3192 3192 3192 3192 
Note: The regressions are run with probit, which is based on standard maximum likelihood estimation 
with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustering within firms. ***, **, * indicate significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. T-statistics based on robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. The dependent variable is R&D Decision Dummy, which takes on value one if the firm 
has positive R&D investment in a specific year, and zero otherwise. The detailed definitions of other 
variables can be found in Table 2. 
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Table 6: Tobit regression on the determinants of R&D intensity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CEO Share 0.0537 0.0659 0.0561 0.0678 
 (1.843)* (2.202)** (1.927)* (2.256)** 
Incentive Compensation 0.0249 0.0220   
 (4.828)*** (4.464)***   
Profit  incentive contract   0.0191 0.0170 
   (3.482)*** (3.267)*** 
Sales incentive contract   0.0385 0.0334 
   (3.795)*** (3.316)*** 
Delta   0.0702 0.0752 
   (2.809)*** (2.840)*** 
College  0.0257  0.0258 
  (2.678)***  (2.675)*** 
Official  0.0315  0.0344 
  (2.049)**  (2.217)** 
Professional   0.0131  0.0129 
  (2.659)***  (2.605)*** 
CEO tenure  -0.0020  -0.0016 
  (0.337)  (0.271) 
ROA 0.0169 0.0318 0.0152 0.0293 
 (0.696) (1.284) (0.622) (1.179) 
Firm Size 0.0177 0.0160 0.0178 0.0160 
 (6.970)*** (7.040)*** (7.029)*** (7.125)*** 
Firm Age -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 
 (1.196) (1.005) (1.357) (1.151) 
Population 0.0155 0.0143 0.0163 0.0153 
 (3.080)*** (2.898)*** (3.288)*** (3.127)*** 
GDP growth 0.0012 -0.0002 0.0022 0.0009 
 (0.265) (0.048) (0.481) (0.189) 
University 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 
 (0.838) (0.719) (0.945) (0.810) 
Competition Dummies yes yes yes yes 
Industry Dummies yes yes yes yes 
Constant -0.2951 -0.2860 -0.3108 -0.3049 
 (3.995)*** (3.887)*** (4.217)*** (4.143)*** 
Observations 3192 3192 3192 3192 
Note: The regressions are run with tobit, which is based on standard maximum likelihood estimation 
with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustering within firms. The variance is adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity by firm size. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. T-statistics based on robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is 
R&D intensity, which is the amount of R&D spending as a percentage of total sales. The detailed 
definitions of other variables can be found in Table 2. 
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Table 7: IV Tobit & IV probit regressions for R&D decision and intensity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 IVTOBIT IVTOBIT IVTOBIT IVTOBIT IVPROBIT IVPROBIT 
CEO Share 0.1528 0.1617 0.0863 0.0995 1.3231 0.6486 
 (5.084)*** (5.400)*** (3.554)*** (4.103)*** (3.493)*** (2.155)** 
Incentive 
Compensation 
0.0324 0.0287   0.4238  
 (5.325)*** (4.664)***   (5.417)***  
Profit  incentive 
contract 
  0.0323 0.0286  0.3671 
   (4.653)*** (4.101)***  (4.020)*** 
Sales incentive contract   0.0685 0.0660  0.8258 
   (4.804)*** (4.597)***  (4.402)*** 
Delta   0.0151 0.0223  1.7080 
   (0.276) (0.411)  (1.984)** 
College  0.0275  0.0268 0.2434 0.2356 
  (4.318)***  (4.212)*** (3.282)*** (3.165)*** 
Official  0.0395  0.0420 0.3641 0.3960 
  (3.435)***  (3.656)*** (2.437)** (2.661)*** 
Professional   0.0170  0.0158 0.1262 0.1139 
  (3.956)***  (3.653)*** (2.367)** (2.130)** 
CEO tenure  0.0049  0.0062 0.0705 0.0844 
  (1.156)  (1.449) (1.346) (1.602) 
ROA 0.0832 0.0936 0.0846 0.0922 2.1034 1.9935 
 (2.140)** (2.409)** (2.166)** (2.361)** (4.388)*** (4.134)*** 
Firm Size 0.0134 0.0111 0.0127 0.0106 0.2908 0.2874 
 (7.796)*** (6.302)*** (7.421)*** (6.063)*** (12.971)*** (12.800)*** 
Firm Age -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0066 -0.0073 
 (2.897)*** (2.720)*** (3.149)*** (2.973)*** (2.958)*** (3.283)*** 
Population 0.0155 0.0144 0.0168 0.0157 0.2381 0.2635 
 (3.029)*** (2.817)*** (3.266)*** (3.072)*** (3.684)*** (4.054)*** 
GDP growth 0.0040 0.0015 0.0049 0.0027 0.0234 0.0446 
 (0.844) (0.327) (1.025) (0.568) (0.403) (0.759) 
University 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003 0.0049 0.0047 
 (1.973)** (1.567) (1.848)* (1.507) (1.797)* (1.728)* 
Competition Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Industry Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Constant -0.3280 -0.3181 -0.3372 -0.3339 -4.7747 -5.0952 
 (4.660)*** (4.516)*** (4.752)*** (4.694)*** (5.490)*** (5.795)*** 
Observations 3192 3192 3192 3192 3192 3192 
Note: ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. T-statistics are in parentheses. 
Following Fisman and Svensson (2007), the instruments are industry-location average of the 
potentially endogenous variables (CEO share, Incentive Compensation, Profit incentive contract, Sales 
incentive contract, delta, ROA). Columns (1) to (4) are based on IV Trobit estimation. Columns (5) and 
(6) are based on IV Probit estimation. 
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Table 8: Robust Tests on R&D Intensity: Firm size dummies and size square term 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CEO Share 0.1498 0.1594 0.0864 0.6546 
 (4.995)*** (5.335)*** (3.553)*** (2.172)** 
Incentive Compensation 0.0325 0.0288   
 (5.311)*** (4.672)***   
Profit  incentive contract   0.0321 0.3631 
   (4.612)*** (3.974)*** 
Sales incentive contract   0.0683 0.8240 
   (4.790)*** (4.392)*** 
Delta   0.0156 1.7193 
   (0.285) (1.997)** 
College  0.0292  0.2339 
  (4.626)***  (3.140)*** 
Official  0.0367  0.3946 
  (3.195)***  (2.648)*** 
Professional   0.0175  0.1114 
  (4.047)***  (2.081)** 
CEO tenure  0.0046  0.0889 
  (1.081)  (1.686)* 
ROA 0.0764 0.0893 0.0855 2.0033 
 (1.966)** (2.299)** (2.187)** (4.153)*** 
Large firm 0.0391 0.0308   
 (7.052)*** (5.474)***   
Median firm 0.0169 0.0113   
 (3.316)*** (2.206)**   
Firm Size   0.0134 0.3007 
   (7.310)*** (12.724)*** 
Firm Size Square   -0.0000 -0.0000 
   (1.033) (1.773)* 
Firm Age -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0074 
 (2.678)*** (2.476)** (3.160)*** (3.303)*** 
Population 0.0164 0.0153 0.0166 0.2611 
 (3.196)*** (2.990)*** (3.217)*** (4.015)*** 
GDP growth 0.0058 0.0030 0.0050 0.0497 
 (1.227) (0.643) (1.039) (0.846) 
University 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004 0.0049 
 (1.792)* (1.344) (1.895)* (1.792)* 
Competition Dummies yes yes yes yes 
Industry Dummies yes yes yes yes 
Constant -0.2980 -0.2936 -0.3396 -5.1997 
 (4.200)*** (4.143)*** (4.783)*** (5.901)*** 
Observations 3192 3192 3192 3192 
Note: The regressions are run with IV Tobit models. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. T-statistics are in parentheses. The dependent variable is R&D intensity, 
which is the amount of R&D spending as a percentage of total sales. Based on the sample distribution, 
a firm is classified as a large firm if there are more than 329 employees in the firm. A firm is classified 
as a medium size firm if there are more than 109 but less than 329 employees in the firm. The 
benchmark group is the group of small firms. The detailed definitions of other variables can be found 
in Table 2.
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Table 9: Managerial Incentives, CEO characteristics and New Product Sales  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CEO Share 0.5377 0.5327 0.3877 0.3718 
 (3.696)*** (3.651)*** (3.346)*** (3.201)*** 
Incentive Compensation 0.1341 0.1393   
 (4.565)*** (4.646)***   
Profit  incentive contract   0.1112 0.1150 
   (3.302)*** (3.378)*** 
Sales incentive contract   0.1902 0.2062 
   (2.692)*** (2.867)*** 
Delta   0.2547 0.2434 
   (0.935) (0.893) 
College  0.0205  0.0203 
  (0.704)  (0.700) 
Official  -0.0604  -0.0489 
  (0.963)  (0.779) 
Professional   -0.0250  -0.0250 
  (1.204)  (1.205) 
CEO tenure  0.0262  0.0280 
  (1.280)  (1.369) 
ROA 1.1896 1.1759 1.1867 1.1729 
 (6.478)*** (6.359)*** (6.449)*** (6.329)*** 
Firm Size 0.0755 0.0765 0.0749 0.0760 
 (9.183)*** (8.970)*** (9.133)*** (8.923)*** 
Firm Age -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0008 
 (0.785) (0.710) (0.993) (0.940) 
Population 0.0666 0.0664 0.0689 0.0690 
 (2.703)*** (2.693)*** (2.791)*** (2.794)*** 
GDP growth 0.0285 0.0286 0.0305 0.0308 
 (1.250) (1.247) (1.331) (1.338) 
University 0.0035 0.0036 0.0035 0.0036 
 (3.363)*** (3.367)*** (3.343)*** (3.350)*** 
Competition Dummies yes yes yes yes 
Industry Dummies yes yes yes yes 
Constant -1.5796 -1.6387 -1.5944 -1.6617 
 (4.696)*** (4.825)*** (4.720)*** (4.867)*** 
Observations 3192 3192 3192 3192 
 
Note: The regressions are run with IV Tobit models. T-statistics are in parentheses. The dependent 
variable is sales of new product, measured as a percentage of total sales. The detailed definitions of 
other variables can be found in Table 2. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively.  
 
